

## Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-13 ADP-00 PM-07 AEC-11 AF-10 ARA-11

CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-11 H-02 INR-10 L-03 NASA-04 NEA-10

NSAE-00 NSC-10 OIC-04 PA-03 PRS-01 RSC-01 GAC-01

SCI-06 SS-15 MBFR-03 USIA-12 SAJ-01 /194 R

DRAFTED BY ACDA/ IR: PRMAYHEW: LSQ

6/7/73 EXT 20834

APPROVED BY ACDA/ IR: AFNEIDLE

PM/ DCA: RMARTIN

----- 027087

R 072355 Z JUN 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION GENEVA

INFO USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 110664

DISTO

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, UK

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1. BRITISH EMBOFFS CALLED ON ACDA OFFICERS JUNE 6 FOR  
USUAL CONSULTATIONS IN ADVANCE OF OPENING OF CCD SESSION.  
BRITISH ASKED HOW WE PLANNED TO HANDLE CW QUESTION AT  
SESSION. ACDA OFFICER SAID THAT WE HAD NOT TAKEN ANY  
DECISION ON WHETHER THE US WILL PRESENT A SPECIFIC  
PROPOSAL TO THE CCD. IT REMAINED POSSIBLE THAT WE MIGHT  
DO SO, BUT IT NOW SEEMED THAT WE PROBABLY WOULD NOT  
BE PRESENTING SUCH A PROPOSAL, AT LEAST DURING  
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THE FIRST HALF OF THE CCD, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT OUR INTENTION TO CONSULT FULLY WITH OUR ALLIES.

2. ACDA OFFICER THEN BRIEFED UK EMBOFFS ON US APPROACH AS CONTAINED IN RECENT TACTICS PAPER APPROVED FOR USE AT CCD ( COPIES BEING POUCHED TO ADDRESSEES). WE NOW PLANNED IN OUR OPENING STATEMENT AT GENEVA TO NOTE THE DESIRE OF MANY COUNTRIES TO ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE COMPREHENSIVE PROHIBITIONS ON CW AND TO STATE THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN EXPLORING WHAT POSSIBILITIES MAY EXIST FOR

ACHIEVING EFFECTIVELY VERIFIED COMPREHENSIVE PROHIBITIONS. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN COMPREHENSIVE PROHIBITIONS, WE WOULD ALSO URGE CONTINUED CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE PARTIAL MEASURES. WE WOULD BE TRYING TO SERVE SEVERAL TACTICAL OBJECTIVES: TO DIFFUSE FOCUS ON THE SOVIET COMPREHENSIVE DRAFT IN THE CCD; TO DEMONSTRATE SOME OF THE PROBLEMS OF A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH; AND TO SERVE THE WESTERN INTEREST OF NOT LEAVING THE FIELD SOLELY TO THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES.

3. ACDA OFFICER CONTINUED THAT OUR TACTICS HAD AN OBVIOUS RELATION TO THE UK' S INTEREST IN VERIFICATION FOR A COMPREHENSIVE TREATY AND WE WOULD REGARD IT AS HELPFUL IF THE BRITISH SAW FIT TO SUBMIT THEIR IDEAS FOR GENERAL DISCUSSION AT THE CCD. WE WOULD EXPECT TO COMMENT FAVORABLY ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE BRITISH IDEAS, BUT MIGHT ALSO WISH TO RAISE SOME QUESTIONS OR SUGGEST MODIFICATIONS OR ALTERNATIVES REGARDING SOME POINTS. WE NATURALLY HOPED THAT ANY BRITISH MEMORANDUM CONTAINING SUGGESTIONS ON VERIFICATION WOULD AVOID BEING SO HARSH OR EXTREME IN ITS DEMANDS AS TO BE VULNERABLE TO THE CHARGE OF BEING DESIGNED TO FRUSTRATE ALL PROGRESS. ACDA OFFICER CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT WE WOULD WISH TO MAINTAIN THIS CONSULTATION AS CONFIDENTIAL BETWEEN JUST OURSELVES AND THE BRITISH, UNTIL WE DISCUSSED OUR TACTICAL APPROACH WITH OTHER WESTERN CCD ALLIES, WHICH WE WOULD DO JUST BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE CCD.

4. EMBOFFS EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING ABOVE POINTS AND OF TACTICAL APPROACH IN GENERAL. THEY NOTED THAT ANY CONFIDENTIAL

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BRITISH CONTRIBUTION WOULD BE ESPECIALLY HELPFUL IN EARLY PART OF CCD SESSION AND ASSUMED THAT FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WOULD USEFULLY CONTINUE BETWEEN OUR DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA. ROGERS

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\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* n/a

\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* CONFIDENTIAL

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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** boyleja  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
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**Subject:** CHEMICAL WEAPONS  
**TAGS:** PARM, UK  
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